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The aim of this paper is to assess empirically whether speculative financial investments 
have affected wheat price dynamics in recent years. To address this issue we will (1) 
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Introduction
Recent agricultural commodity price fluctuations have raised a wide debate. The
sharp price increases in 2007/2008 and 2010/2011, and the even quicker fall that
took place between the two spikes, were surprisingly fast and deep. In June 2008
agricultural prices peaked at their highest level in 30 years, and then fell sharply in
the next six months. In 2010 there was a new steep rise, with prices peaking in early
2011 at levels higher than those reached in 2008.
These price swings were common to all agricultural (but also energy and metal)
commodities, and don’t appear to be fundamental-driven, since offer and demand
dynamics were not (and probably cannot be) so volatile in the short term. They had a
dramatic impact on poverty and food security in many countries. A highly debated
and controversial issue is if, and to what extent, these price dynamics were affected
by financial speculation.
As a matter of fact, during the second half of the 2000s financial investors flooded
agricultural commodity futures markets with what was called a ‘wall of money’. This
was part of a larger shift in portfolio strategy, which drove financial institutions away
from traditional equity markets towards commodity and real estate derivatives (Basu
and Gavin, 2011). 2007 saw a huge further increase in commodity derivatives
growth, as financial capitals were running away from the collapsing US housing
market. Between 2004 and 2008, the notional amount of commodity derivatives
traded OTC grew by an impressive 900% and the number of contracts traded in
organized exchanges increased by a no less remarkable 214%. After a temporary fall
between late 2008 and 2009, commodity derivatives trading restarted growing,
reaching new transactions peaks in 2011. Some observers argue that, as a result of
these events, commodity futures prices – which represent the benchmark for spot
prices – now depend on financial markets’ expectations rather than market
fundamentals (Unctad 2009 and 2011, Iatp 2011). Time-series recently published by
the US market authority (CFTC) show that in the period 2006-2010 speculative
transactions by financial investors played a main role in price formation in all
agricultural commodity futures markets.
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The remarkable growth of financial speculative investments in commodities was
fuelled by a mix of macroeconomic, monetary and legislative factors, which we try to
identify in the second section of this paper.
In the third section we present an econometric analysis, using Hard Red Winter
(HRW) wheat price as a case study. HRW is the most traded wheat in international
markets, and according to the FAO its price represents the benchmark for all
international wheat prices. In a first stage of the analysis we directly test the
relationship between financial speculative investment flows and HRW wheat price
fluctuations. This direct approach is limited by a lack of information: available data
only cover some centralized exchanges, time-series are short and they present
several flaws. In a second stage of the analysis, more indicative because of a better
availability of data, we use an indirect approach which mainly focuses on the evolving
relationship between wheat price dynamics, equity market returns and oil prices.
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I. Recent agricultural price dynamics and their drivers
A long phase of stability and moderation in international agricultural prices, which
started in the early Eighties, ended abruptly in the second half of the last decade.
Crop prices began to rise sharply in 2007, and by June 2008 they had reached their
highest level in thirty years. The subsequent reversal was even faster, with prices
falling by around 40% in six months (between July 2008 and January 2009). A new
surge has been observed since spring 2010, with prices peaking in early 2011 at
levels slightly higher than those reached in 2008.
Dramatic swings
These fluctuations are displayed in the patterns of the monthly food price indices
compiled by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and by the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of the United Nations. To arrange a longer time-series, we
calculated a price index for the four most traded agricultural commodities (rice, corn,
wheat and soybeans)1.  This four-crop index shows even greater volatility than the
more comprehensive indices calculated by the IMF and the FAO (Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 – Monthly indices of international agricultural commodity prices (Jan 1990=100)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on IMF and FAO data
These events had dramatic worldwide impacts on food security and poverty. Among
countries, the low-income food-deficit (LIFDCs) ones were hit the most, as food
imports represent a larger share of their balance of payments. Within countries, the
most adverse impacts were suffered by low-income families, as they tend to spend a
1 Similarly to the ‘four crops index’ calculated by the Us Department of Agriculture (USDA) in their June
2011 report (USDA, 2011). In that report, the USDA Economic Research Service calculates a weighted
average of the four crops’ prices, while here we calculate a simple average. The resulting time-series
is analogous.
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larger share of their income on food commodities. According to World Bank
estimates, between 130 and 150 million people were pushed below the poverty line
by food price increases in 2007/2008, while the FAO has calculated that the number
of people suffering from chronic hunger increased by 115 million, reaching the sad
record figure of one billion (FAO, 2009; De Hoyos and Medvedev, 2009). Nor did
developing countries' farmers benefit from high prices. As a 2009 FAO report shows,
they were too disconnected from international markets to profit from high prices, and
instead they were hit hard by increasing input costs (FAO, 2009).
A key feature of recent price trends is that they were shared not only by all
agricultural commodities (as shown in Table 1.1 and Figure 1.2, with only sugar and
rice partially deviating from the common trend), but even by energy and metals
(Figure 1.3).
A further – and no less relevant - aspect to be stressed is the strong (negative)
correlation between commodity prices and the US dollar exchange rate. It can be
reasonably argued that this correlation has existed for a long time, since commodities
are priced in dollars on international markets. In oligopolistic markets (such as
international agricultural markets), when facing exchange rate variations, exporters
tend to move prices, ceteris paribus, in order to keep real prices fixed. Nevertheless,
this correlation has become remarkably stronger since the late 2000s. As shown in
Figure 1.4, the agricultural commodities price pattern became almost the mirror
image of the US Dollar exchange rate dynamics.
Table 1.1 – International prices of main food commodities (% change)
2002-2006 Jan ’07 – June ‘08 June ’08 – Dec ‘08 Dec ’08 – June  ‘11
Wheat 63% 78% -37% 48%
Corn 75% 75% -45% 96%
Rice 62% 166% -34% -6%
Soybeans 52% 116% -42% 57%
Meat (index) 11% 32% -18% 42%
Oils (index) 46% 103% -41% 117%
Source: Author’s own elaboration on IMF data
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Figure 1.2 – International agricultural commodity prices: wheat, maize, rice and soybeans
Figure 1.3 – IMF price indices of food, energy and metal commodities
Source (Figures 1.2-1.3): Author’s own elaboration on IMF data
Figure 1.4 – FAO Food Index and US Dollar exchange rate*
Source: Author’s own elaboration on USDA and FAO data
* We use the Agricultural Weighted Exchange Rate (calculated by the USDA), a weighted average of the dollar exchange rate
against a basket of currencies, with weights based on agricultural trade
The main drivers of agricultural prices in the 2000s
There exists ample literature whose aim is to detect the main factors behind recent
food price dynamics. From its reading, we can pick out the following most recurring
themes.
- Offer and demand factors. On the demand side, the growth of emerging countries
(often with special regard to China and India) (IMF, 2008), and the increasing
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demand for biofuels (as a consequence of new incentives and legal constraints
imposed in the EU and in the US) (Mitchell, 2008; Timmer 2008). On the supply side,
weather-related events in exporting countries (FAO, 2009; USDA, 2011) and the
decline of agricultural productivity which has resulted from years of diminishing
investment in agricultural research (USDA, 2011).
- The tightening of world stocks. According to some authors, stocks reached a
critically low level, so the marginal price effect of variations in the
production/consumption ratio was much more intense than usual (Abbot et al., 2008
and 2009; OECD, 2008; Dawe, 2009).
- The depreciation of the US Dollar. When measured in other currencies, price
fluctuations are considerably less dramatic (Abbot et al., 2008).
- The steep rise in the price of oil. This factor may have affected supply, through
increasing input costs, but most of all demand, causing a higher profitability in
biofuels production (Abbott et al., 2008 and 2009; FAO, 2009).
- Protectionist measures, implemented in some countries when price increases
started to intensify (FAO, 2009; Timmer, 2008).
- The financialization of agricultural commodity markets, i.e. the strong inflow of
speculative investments in these markets, coming from financial actors which are not
involved in physical agricultural markets. (Masters and White 2008, UNCTAD 2009
and 2011, OECD 2008, FAO 2009, US Senate 2009, IATP 2011, Gilbert 2008 and
2009).
On the one hand, there seems to be widespread consensus on this list. On the other
hand, all the mentioned themes are in some way controversial. In most cases, the
disagreement concerns the weights to be attributed to the different issues, and the
existence of a dominant factor. The subject of this article – the role played by
financial investors – is probably the most controversial among these issues. Some
authors consider the steep rise in agricultural commodity prices to be the result of a
speculative bubble (Masters and White, 2008; Gilbert, 2009; UNCTAD, 2009 and
2011; IATP, 2008; De Schutter, 2010). Others argue that financial speculation was not
influential at all (Irwin and Sanders 2011), while most papers and reports mention the
financialization among the main factors behind recent price movements, but state
that there is not enough information to quantify its impact. In the remainder of this
section we go over briefly some of the points listed above, in order to obtain a
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synthetic map of the factors which drove international agricultural prices in recent
years, before delving into our main subject. We will keep our focus on short-run
factors, as we assume that the price impacts of financial speculation are felt in the
short term, and not in the long term.
Price formation in the long run and in the short run
International agricultural prices are moved by a complex interaction between
exogenous and endogenous factors. From the perspective of this work, the
distinction between long run and short run factors is particularly important, as we are
interested in the recent short-term price movements.
Long-term trends (e.g. the declining - in real terms - trend which was observed since
the end of the Seventies until the first half of the 2000s) are mainly affected, on the
demand side, by the world’s population and income growth and evolution of dietary
patterns, while on the supply side they depend on national agricultural policies,
climate change, relative price changes and technological progress. These factors
have a slow and gradual – but extremely persistent – impact on prices. They
determine structural trends. Short term fluctuations around these long-term trends
are instead determined by short-run shocks. These fluctuations can sometimes be
ample and quite persistent, because of the low price elasticity which characterizes
both supply and demand in the short run. Usually, demand shocks are less frequent
but more persistent then supply-driven ones (which mainly depend on weather-
related events). Long-term factors were at the root of the reversal of the previous
declining price trend which happened during the 2000s. But only short-run factors
could have determined the 2008 and 2011 price peaks, and 2008/2009 fall. That is
why this article is focused on short term factors. The difficulty of distinguishing
between long-term and short-term price drivers is a critical issue which is common to
a large part of the existing literature. As a consequence, for example, many works
blame the growth of meat and dairy consumption in emerging countries, or
population growth, for the 2007/2008 price surge. As effectively stated by Wahl
(2009, quoted in De Schutter 2010), it is difficult to imagine that in 2007 a multitude of
people “suddenly developed a taste for consuming vast quantities of dairy products,
driving its price up by 157% between 2006 and November 2007, only to lose it
starting from July 2008, allowing prices to start falling again”.
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Production and consumption and the role of “low” stocks
During the 2000s, an overall cereal production deficit was observed in six years out
of ten. Consequently, the price trend edged upwards, even if – as we can observe in
Figure 1.5 – main exporters’ stocks didn’t show a clear downwards trend.
Figure 1.5a – World cereal market
Supply, utilization and production in million tonnes (left axis), stock-to-use ratios in percentage points (right axis)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on FAO and USDA data
Figure 1.5b – World coarse grain market
Supply, utilization and production in million tonnes (left axis), stock-to-use ratios in percentage points (right axis)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on FAO and USDA data
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Figure 1.5c – World rice market
Supply, utilization and production in million tonnes (left axis), stock-to-use ratios in percentage points (right axis)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on FAO and USDA data
This dynamic was fueled by slowing productivity growth - outpaced by demand
growth - and by some droughts which affected big exporting countries, especially in
2005, 2006 and 2011. On the demand side, the growth in demand for biofuels
contributed to the increase in maize (for ethanol) and vegetable oils (for biodiesel)
consumption, and influenced all of their substitutes, both in terms of consumption and
of land use. Nevertheless, if we stick to the data made available by the FAO and the
USDA, physical market fundamentals don’t appear to justify the steep price rises of
2007/2008 and 2010/2011. In these years there was no particular consumption peak,
nor a significant production fall. Moreover, the fundamentals of each market can help
in explaining the differences between the behaviors of each single commodity price,
but they can’t explain generalized trends which were followed by almost all food and
non-food commodities.
Many authors argue that recent price shocks were caused by the low level of world
agricultural stocks (Abbott et al., 2008). Their argument goes as follows: when stocks
are rather high, a gap between production and consumption can be easily absorbed
without significant impacts on prices; on the contrary, when the stocks-to-use ratio
falls to low levels, stocks are no longer seen as an effective buffer which can fill any
production gap. In this situation, even small demand/supply shocks can cause huge
price shifts. As a matter of fact, between 2004 and 2005 world stocks of all main
agricultural commodities reached their lowest level in thirty years (Figure 1.6). On the
other hand, as some authors properly observed (Dawe, 2009), the decline in world
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stocks was just the effect of the planned reduction of huge Chinese stocks. At the
beginning of the 2000s, China’s stock-to-use ratios of main food commodities were
between three and eight times higher than the world average. Starting in 2001, China
reduced its stocks, bringing them to a much lower – but still above-average – level.
Moreover, China is not a major participant in international agricultural markets, being
substantially self-sufficient with regard to almost all the main crops (the only
important exception being soybeans). According to FAO and USDA data, the
reduction of Chinese stocks didn’t have a significant impact on world markets, so it
seems more correct to analyze world stocks data excluding China. As shown in
Figure 1.7, if we exclude China, world stocks weren’t at a low level in the second half
of the 2000s, so it seems incorrect to ascribe recent price shifts to low stock levels.
Figure 1.6 – Stock-to-use ratio - World
Source: Author’s own elaboration on USDA data
Figure 1.7 – Stock-to-use ratio – World excluding China
Source: Author’s own elaboration on USDA data
Macroeconomic factors
As we have just seen, recent agricultural price dynamics are not fully explained by
the evolution of market fundamentals, which weren’t (and cannot be) so volatile in the
short term. Moreover, the recent short-term trends were common to all food and non-
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food commodities, suggesting that they were determined by common
macroeconomic and financial factors. As stated by Abbott et al. (2009),
“Macroeconomic forces have been critical to the recent history of agricultural
commodity prices, and will play a key role in determining their future evolution. (…)
Market-specific supply and utilization events will, however, continue to drive prices
around these macroeconomic and energy market trends”. The US dollar exchange
rate and oil prices were the main macro factors which heavily influenced recent
commodity price dynamics. As the empirical analysis presented in the third section
will show, in recent years there was a clear structural break in the relations between
these macroeconomic variables and agricultural prices. Moreover, as we will see, a
third important correlation evolved and became significant in recent years: the one
between agricultural prices and stock market returns.
Oil prices and exchange rates may have been two important transmission channels,
which allowed macroeconomic and financial dynamics to affect commodity prices.
The decline of the US Dollar is an important, but not exhaustive, explanation for the
recent price movements. If we examine this effect, by calculating prices in other
currencies, the recent price swings are still evident, even if they become less sharp
(Abbott, Hurt and Tyner 2008). Biofuel production, influenced by the gasoline price
evolution, greatly increased, but – as we have already mentioned – production and
consumption dynamics (in which biofuel demand is included) are not able to fully
explain the 2008 and 2011 price peaks, let alone the late 2008 price slump. As stated
by a 2009 FAO report, “biofuel demand alone cannot explain the extent of the price
increases in 2007 and early 2008”. Moreover, the 2010/2011 price increases are
happening within a framework of a slowdown in the growth of demand for biofuel.
A key feature of the recent period was the unprecedented growth of speculative
financial investments in agricultural commodity futures markets. The so-called
“financialization” of commodity markets may have been a main factor which allowed
the transmission of macroeconomic and financial turbulences to agricultural
commodity markets. In other words, speculative dynamics may have been the cause
of the structural break in the correlation between agricultural prices, the Us Dollar
exchange rate, stock market returns and agricultural prices. As a matter of fact, the
new actors that joined commodity markets - investment banks, hedge funds,
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commodity index funds, pension funds - are traditionally more reactive to
macroeconomic signals than to physical agricultural market fundamentals. The next
section will describe and quantify the financialization of agricultural commodity
markets, and outline its underlying causes, while in the third section we present an
econometric analysis, which aims to test empirically the hypothesis that financial
actors influenced recent food price dynamics, using Hard Red Winter wheat as a
case study.
II. The financialization of agricultural commodity markets
Commodity derivatives markets experienced a remarkable growth during the second
half of the last decade, which involved both centralized exchanges and over-the-
counter (OTC) transactions. Rocketing transaction volumes and open interest
resulted from a huge inflow of financial speculative investments, coming from
investment banks, pension funds, hedge funds and other institutional investors.
Figure 2.1 – Commodity derivative instruments traded on organized exchanges
(millions of contracts)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on B.I.S. data
Figure 2.2 – Notional amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives
(trillions of US Dollars)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on B.I.S. data
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As some market analysts put it, during the 2000s financial investors flooded
commodity futures and options markets with a “wall of money”. This was part of a
larger shift in portfolio strategy, which drove financial institutions away from traditional
equity markets towards commodity and real estate derivatives (Basu and Gavin,
2011). Both in commodity exchanges and OTC, commodity derivatives entered a
boom phase in 2005, with a huge further acceleration in 2007.
To understand these remarkable trends, it is helpful to outline a brief timeline. In
1991 Goldman Sachs launched its Commodity Index (GSCI, then S&P-GSCI), a
weighted average of different commodity futures prices, “designed to provide
investors with a reliable and publicly available benchmark for investment
performance in commodity markets” (Goldman Sachs & Co., 2004). During the
Nineties some financial investors, mainly hedge funds (Basu and Gavin, 2011)
started investing in commodities, but it was in the 2000s that the phenomenon took
new and more significant proportions. The collapse of the dotcom bubble was a
decisive turning point, which resulted in a huge stock market crash. In the aftermath
of this crisis a new cycle was opened, characterized by the search for alternative
investments. Considerable amounts of capital were moved away from traditional
equity markets towards commodity and (above all) US real estate derivatives
markets. In 2006/2007, US house prices started to decline, marking the beginning of
the US real estate and mortgage market collapse. Consequently financial investors
started to turn away from these markets, and many of them diverted their capital into
commodities. In 2007 and early 2008 there was a peak in commodity derivatives
trading, and at the same time in the price of all main commodities. Between 2004 and
2008 the notional amount of commodity derivatives traded OTC grew by an
impressive 900%, while the number of contracts traded in organized exchanges
increased by a no less remarkable 214%. The trend was reversed during 2008, when
the financial crisis dramatically worsened, becoming a severe and generalized credit
crunch (Orleàn, 2011). There was a fall in commodity derivatives trading, as financial
institutions were selling their assets in an attempt to get liquidity and cover losses.
Commodity prices collapsed. The slump was reversed in late 2009, when a new rise
of financial investments in commodities commenced. Financial actors had started
making profits again, helped by a huge public intervention, and investments in
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commodities soared. In the spring of 2011, volume traded in commodity exchanges
was 39% above the 2008 peak, while data on OTC transactions are not available yet.
These events were allowed to happen by a process of deregulation of commodity
futures markets, the main steps of which were the exemption of some financial actors
from speculative position limits (starting in 1991), and the deregulation of OTC
markets (with the Commodity Exchange Modernization Act of 2000).
The case for commodities as an asset class
Besides the vicissitudes of financial market developments, we can recognize three
main factors at the root of the new appeal of commodities as an asset class. On the
one hand, low interest rates set by the Federal Reserve pushed up the demand for
any risky asset, as the lower cost of credit caused risk premiums to decrease.
Moreover - and no less decisive - there was a widespread (and not completely
groundless) belief that a new commodity super-cycle had just started, sustained by
growth in emerging countries. Last but not least, some influential studies – market
analyses by financial firms and also academic papers - claimed that not only
commodities were a profitable investment, but that they even represented a hedge
against the economic cycle. Actually, the existence of a negative correlation between
commodity cycles and economic cycles is rather counterintuitive – except for some
precious metals – and was later disputed by several empirical works (for example
Buyuksahin et al., 2008). The most influential was probably a 2004 paper by Gorton
and Rouwenhorst. Using a four decades long time-series (1959-2004), they simulate
a long-term investment in a commodity index, with a rolling strategy of substituting
each near-maturity futures contract with the next. (The same strategy adopted by
commodity index funds, which in that period were starting to gain popularity). Gorton
and Rouwenhorst showed that such a strategy would have entailed broadly the same
mean return of an index-based equity investment2, with the same risk premium (as
measured by the Sharpe ratio). More importantly, they showed the returns of their
simulated investment in commodities to be negatively correlated with the equity index
returns and with bond yields, and positively related to both expected and non-
expected inflation. The authors, and with them many financial actors, inferred from
2 The equity index considered in their paper is the S&P 500.
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these results that commodities were a hedge against the economic cycle (Gorton and
Rouwenhorts, 2004). In the same month (June 2004), Goldman Sachs published a
report entitled “The Case for Commodities as an Asset Class”, in which the
investment firm “recommends a strategic allocation to commodities as a separate
asset class to hedge macroeconomic risk, decrease expected portfolio risk and to
increase expected portfolio returns” and claims that “commodities are significantly
negatively correlated with both Bonds and Equities. This implies that the volatility of a
portfolio can be significantly decreased even by allocating only a small percentage of
the portfolio to commodities” (Goldman Sachs & Co. 2004).
Agricultural commodity markets and financialization
Disaggregated data about agricultural derivatives markets are available only for US
commodity exchanges, and are provided by the US market authority (CFTC). These
time-series (Figure 2.3) show that agricultural commodities were part of the new
investment strategies. Transaction volumes and open interest consistently soared in
all US agricultural exchanges, with increases between 200% and 400% in the period
2004-2008. All these markets experienced a slump in late 2008, with a new rise
starting in late 2009. The correlation with the price dynamics is clear, but what we
don’t know (and will try to discover through empirical analysis in the next section) is if
financial investors actually influenced prices, or if the causality was reversed, with
investors entering and exiting the market in reaction to price movements and
expected price movements.
CFTC data even show that in the period 2006-2010 (the only one for which reliable
data about the composition of the market are available) financial investors held a
major part of the open interest in all US agricultural commodity exchanges. In
particular, most financial investments in agricultural commodities were made through
commodity index funds.
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Table 3.1 – Agricultural commodities futures market composition – period 2006-2010 (Millions of
contracts*)
Wheat Futures - Chicago Board Of Trade
Volume Long Short Total netpositions
Net positions
%
Commercial Hedgers 69.0 16.5 52.5 -36.0 38%
Money Managers 33.1 13.6 19.5 -5.9 6%
Index Traders 58.8 53.4 5.4 48.0 50%
Non-reported 25.3 9.6 15.7 -6.1 6%
Total 186.2 93.1 93.1 0.0 100%
Wheat Futures - Kansas City Board Of Trade
Volume Long Short Total netpositions
Net positions
%
Commercial Hedgers 29.3 8.7 20.6 -11.9 43%
Money Managers 11.4 8.4 3.0 5.4 20%
Index Traders 8.8 8.5 0.3 8.3 30%
Non-reported 13.7 6.0 7.7 -1.8 7%
Total 63.2 31.6 31.6 0.0 100%
Corn Futures - Chicago Board Of Trade
Volume Long Short Total netpositions
Net positions
%
Commercial Hedgers 294.6 95.9 198.6 -102.7 39%
Money Managers 84.2 58.0 26.1 31.9 12%
Index Traders 113.6 106.1 7.6 98.5 38%
Non-reported 120.2 46.3 74.0 -27.7 11%
Total 612.6 306.3 306.3 0.0 100%
Soybeans Futures - Chicago Board Of Trade
Volume Long Short Total netpositions
Net positions
%
Commercial hedgers 101.4 30.0 71.3 -41.3 41%
Money Managers 33.6 22.8 10.8 12.0 12%
Index Traders 43.7 40.9 2.8 38.0 38%
Non-reported 41.8 16.5 25.3 -8.7 9%
Total 220.5 110.2 110.2 0.0 100%
*A contract amounts to 5.000 bushels
Source: Author’s own elaboration and computation on CFTC data
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Figure 2.3 – Agricultural commodity derivatives on centralized exchanges
(Open Interest and prices, 2004=100)
Source: Author’s own elaboration on CFTC and IMF data
The actors in the agricultural commodity derivatives market
Before presenting the empirical analysis, it is worth clarifying who are the main actors
in the agricultural commodity derivatives markets, and which aims and strategies
they bring forward. Commercial operators trade commodity derivatives to hedge their
future physical transactions, while financial investors intervene in those markets in
order to profit from price changes, to diversify their portfolio, and/or to hedge against
inflation and the depreciation of the US dollar. Financial investors operating in
commodity markets can be divided into two categories, which we call commodity
index traders and money managers. Commodity index traders are passive agents
whose aim is to gain exposure to commodities as an asset class. They do so by
tracking a commodity index, which is a weighted average of different commodity
prices, with fixed weights (mainly) dependent on world production and updated once
a year. To invest in commodity indices, investors buy financial instruments whose
value is proportional to the value of the indices. These instruments – swap
agreements, ETFs and ETNs – are typically offered by large financial institutions. It is
the latter who practically buy commodity futures contracts, in order to hedge their
commitment with their clients. By contrast, we call active investors, or money
managers, all the financial investors who don’t track a commodity index, but actively
buy and sell futures contracts in an attempt to anticipate price changes.
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III. A case study: 'Kansas City Hard Red Winter' wheat
Objectives and main findings
Our aim is to assess empirically whether speculative financial investments have
affected wheat price dynamics in recent years. In particular, we focus on Hard Red
Winter (HRW) wheat price. HRW is the most traded wheat in international markets,
and according to the FAO its price represents the benchmark for all international
wheat prices. HRW wheat futures contracts are traded on the Kansas City Board of
Trade, which publicly release daily prices and transaction volumes on its website.
Two separate analyses were performed. In the first we directly test the relationship
between financial speculative investment flows and HRW wheat price shifts. This first
analysis is limited by a lack of information: available data only cover centralized
exchange transactions, time-series are short (data are available only for the period
2006-2010, so we can't investigate any potential structural break introduced by
financialization), and they present several flaws (enumerated for example by Tang
and Xiong, 2010, pp.10). In the second analysis, more indicative because of a better
availability of data, we investigate the evolving relationships between wheat futures
prices, US stock market returns, oil futures prices and the US dollar exchange rate.
The results obtained can be summarized as follows:
- HRW wheat prices tend to get higher as the market share of financial investors
increases. However, correlation doesn't necessarily imply causation, and even if it
did, we would not be able to assess the direction of causality.
- Since 2007, HRW wheat price shifts are positively related to US stock market
returns and oil price shifts. These correlations appear to be determined by commodity
index traders, a category of financial investors, since both the relationships proved to
be spurious, with the most tracked commodity index as the confounding variable.
These results proved to be robust to the introduction of some control variables,
namely the US dollar exchange rate, gasoline price (which determines the profitability
of biofuels) and a temporal dummy variable accounting for the global recession.
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Related works
Several works aim to assess the impact of financial investments on commodity
prices. Gilbert (2009) tested several commodities’ price dynamics in order to find
evidence of speculative bubbles, caused by feedback trading or by index trading.
Only in a few commodity markets – in particular soybean and copper – his models
point to a speculative bubble caused by extrapolative expectations, while in many he
finds evidence of a bubble caused by index traders. Other works (in particular
Hernandez and Torero, 2010; Irwin et al., 2009) investigate the issue using Granger
causality tests, with mixed results. More closely related to our article are the works of
Tang and Xiong (2010) and Buyuksahin and Robe (2010). The latter uses non-public
data from the US Market Authority (CFTC) to show that the correlations between the
returns of investable commodities and equity indices increase amid greater
participation by hedge funds. Tang and Xiong, on the other hand, find that since the
early 2000s futures prices of non-energy commodities in the US became increasingly
correlated with oil, and that this trend is systematically more pronounced for
commodities included in the two most popular commodity indices. On the basis of
this result, they suggest that index traders may have played an important role in
affecting commodity prices.
Data
Information about HRW wheat futures prices comes from the Kansas City Board of
Trade, the centralized exchange in which these contracts are traded. We calculated a
weekly weighted average futures price, with weights equal to the trading volumes of
each contract.
- HRW wheat spot price time-series comes from the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA).
- S&P 500 index, used by countless empirical works as a proxy for the US equity
market performance, is available from the Standard & Poor's website. We chose it
among other indices because it is representative of the whole market.
- US Dollar exchange rate dynamics are measured by the Trade Weighted Exchange
Index calculated by the Federal Reserve.
- S&P-GSCI commodity index returns come from Goldman Sachs and were
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downloaded from the website 'Wikiposit'
- Brent futures price and gasoline price are made available by the U.S. Energy
Information Administration.
- Data on futures market operations and net speculative positions were compiled by
the U.S. market authority (the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, CFTC) and
published in its “CIT Supplementary Report”.
In all regressions we used weekly observations of each variable.
Preliminary analysis of the futures price time-series
A preliminary analysis of the futures price time-series revealed the following relevant
characteristics: (1) the variable in levels is not stationary, while its first difference
logarithmic transformation is stationary (2) there is a first-order positive serial
correlation (3) there is autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity3 (3) The error
distribution carries more weight in the tails than a normal distribution, so it is better
approximated by a student-t. These aspects were highlighted by formal tests.
Correlation between spot price and futures price
Commodity futures markets were created (also) with the aim to provide commercial
operators with a benchmark price for their physical transactions. In other words, the
spot price of a commodity is settled on the basis of the futures price determined by
the financial market. If this relation holds, we expect the two prices to be highly
correlated. A preliminary visual analysis (Figure 3.1) doesn't appear to contradict our
hypothesis of a strong correlation. In effect, the correlation coefficient between the
two series in levels is 98.5%, while between the two series in first-differenced natural
logarithms is 90.2%.
If we estimate a mixed autoregressive distributed lag model ADL (3,3) to describe the
relationship between the two variables, we obtain the following result [to simplify, we
show ∆ln(futures price) simply as f, and ∆ln(spot price) simply as s].
3 A time-series presents conditional heteroskedasticity, or volatility clusters, if there is an alternation
between periods of higher and lower volatility.
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Regression 1 – Spot and futures price
Figure 3.1 –HRW wheat spot and futures price
Source: Author’s own elaboration and computations on KCBT and USDA data
Standard errors (and consequently t-statistics) are Newey-West HAC
(Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent), so they are unbiased and
consistent. The intercept is not significantly different from zero. Coefficients are all
significant at the 95% confidence level, except for the second-order autoregressive
coefficient - AR(2). The ft coefficient is different from zero at the 99.9% confidence
level, and its expected value of 0.94 suggests an almost unitary elasticity of spot
price to the current weighted average futures price. Not surprisingly, past values of
the futures price help in predicting the current spot price. Nevertheless, if we re-
estimate this same equation excluding the current average futures price from the
regressors, the R2 declines to 0.045. It is the current values of the futures price
variations which explain the most part of the spot price variability. A Quandt-Andrews
unknown breakpoint test (QLR) shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no
structural break at any confidence level. In other words, the estimated relationship
appears to be stable in the period considered (1991-2011). In conclusion on this first
point, HRW wheat spot and futures prices move together, and at almost the same
pace.
Price and the market share of speculators
In the period 2006-2010 we find a significant (and positive) correlation between
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futures price shifts and the market share of speculators (measured by the ratio
between their net positions and the overall open interest of the market). Using a
Garch(1,1)-t model (more efficient than OLS in presence of conditional
heteroskedasticity) we obtain the following estimates.
Regression 2 – Price and the market share of financial speculators
For each percentage point increase in the market share of financial speculators on
the Kansas City Board of Trade, the HRW wheat price tends to increase by one half
percentage point. Such relation appears to be stable in the period considered (we
found no evidence of a structural break). It is important to clarify that this result does
not necessarily imply that speculators cause wheat price dynamics. The opposite
could also happen, i.e. that a larger number of financial investors join the market
when prices are higher, or there could be other macroeconomic variables affecting
both the wheat price and the market share of speculators.
Wheat price and financial markets – an indirect approach based on conditional
correlations
As indicated by many authors (for example Buyuksahin and Robe, 2010, Tang and
Xiong, 2010, UNCTAD 2009), financial investors are able to create connections
between the different markets in which they operate. In this second analysis we
investigate the conditional correlations between HRW wheat, the US equity market,
and the oil market.
Wheat price, stock market returns, and the S&P-GSCI commodity index.
First of all, we verify if stock market dynamics have any impact on wheat prices. We
include in the regression, as a control variable, the Federal Reserve index of the US
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Dollar's average value, because we know that the US dollar exchange rate is
correlated with both equity returns and wheat prices. For the period between January
1986 and April 2011, we obtain the following.
Regression 3 – Wheat price and stock market dynamics
We estimate a simple OLS model, unbiased and consistent, but in this case not
efficient because of the presence of heteroskedasticity. However, we use it to simply
test for potential structural breaks, and to estimate a breakpoint date. Standard errors
are Newey-West HAC (Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent), i.e. they
are calculated in such a way that they are unbiased and consistent even in the
presence of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
The marginal effect of the S&P 500 coefficient is statistically significant but quite
weak. Small wonder that the US dollar coefficient is negative and significant, given
that which was stated in the first section. Considering that many new factors
intervened during the period considered, it seems appropriate to check for structural
breaks. If there are structural breaks, the estimated coefficients would be rather
meaningless, representing an “average” between significantly different periods.
Indeed a recursive estimation of the coefficients (Figure 3.2) is indicative of a rather
strong structural break, which is confirmed by a Quandt-Andrews unknown
breakpoint test (QLR statistic, Figure 3.3).
The QLR statistic, which we calculated with a 5% truncation4, indicates the last week
of June 2008 as the most probable breakpoint date for the S&P 500 coefficient, and
the last week of August 2008 for the US Dollar coefficient, while it doesn't indicate a
significant break for the AR(1) coefficient (contrary to what Figure 3.2 seems to
suggest). However, the QLR statistics appear to suggest that these structural breaks
may have been rather gradual. For the S&P 500 coefficient, the null hypothesis of no
4 The most common choice is to use a 15% truncation. In this case, we have many observations
(N=1,328) and we need to search for the break in the final part of the sample, so a 5% truncation is
more appropriate.
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structural break can be rejected for all observations between August 2002 and
January 2010, while for the US Dollar coefficient we can reject it for all observation
between June 1993 and October 2009. It is true that the strong intensity of the break
may explain the large extent of these ranges, but on the other hand the dynamic of
the QLR test statistic is really suggestive of a rather gradual structural break.
In considering the following figures, we have to consider that the recursive estimation
of coefficients tends to 'overestimate' the breakpoint date (i.e. it tends to find the
breakpoint later than when it really happened), while the QLR test tends to anticipate
the real breakpoint date, all the more when the break is so drastic. However, the
overall indication seems to be that both structural breaks started gradually in the
early 2000s, and intensified in 2007/2008.
Figure 3.2 – Recursive estimation of the coefficients of regression 3
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Figure 3.3 – QLR test statistic for the S&P 500 coefficient
The next step is to estimate the same equation separately for the two periods, as
suggested by the QLR test statistic. At this stage, we estimate a Garch(1,1)-t model.
In the presence of heteroskedasticity, this model allows us to obtain a more efficient
estimate for the conditional mean, so it is preferable to OLS even if we are not
interested in the conditional variance parameters. We choose 2007 as the breakpoint
date, given what we stated above. The post-break equation is estimated twice. In the
second one (marked by an asterisk) we control – by means of a dummy variable – for
the global recession of 2008/2009, when commodity prices and stock market indices
went down simultaneously. We do so in order to be sure that the correlation we found
is not simply the effect of this period of recession, when most economic variables
went down simultaneously because of the downturn. Basically, what we do is to
exclude from the parameters estimation the period which is highlighted by the blue
area in Figure 3.4. The results obtained are summarized in Table 3.1.
The temporal evolution of the coefficients’ estimates is interesting. US stock market
returns and wheat price movements, uncorrelated until 2006, become positively
related in the period 2007-2011, in a statistically significant way (at a 98.6%
confidence level). The negative correlation between wheat price dynamics and the
US dollar exchange rate is significant even in the 1986-2006 period, but in the late
2000s it became much higher, passing from an estimated coefficient of 0.10 to an
almost unitary one. The evolution of the R2 of the model is interesting too. Until 2006
AR(1), equity index and the US dollar accounted for only 4% of wheat price
variability. In 2007-2011, they accounted for 17%. A considerable share if one
considers that it is referred to the percent change of a financial derivative instrument.
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Summing up, during the late 2000s we observe the development of a positive,
statistically significant and considerable correlation between HRW wheat price
dynamics and US stock market returns. This correlation was not observable in the
previous period. Now we can test the hypothesis that this correlation be determined
by commodity index traders. As mentioned before, HRW wheat is part of the S&P-
GSCI commodity index, with a weight that oscillates yearly between 1 and 2
percentage points. The regression reported in Table 3.2 shows that S&P-GSCI is the
confounding variable which determines the correlation between US stock market
returns and wheat price fluctuations.
Table 3.1 – Correlation between HRW wheat price and stock market returns – Garch (1,1)-t model
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: ∆ln(Pwheat)t
Explicative variables Coefficients
(p-values)
1986-2006 2007-2011 2007-2011°
Constant 0.0002
(0.80)
0.0009
(0.74)
0.002
(0.44)
AR(1) 0.18***
(0.0000)
0.14**
(0.04)
0.13**
(0.05)
∆ln(S&P 500)t 0.008
(0.80)
0.28**
(0.03)
0.26**
(0.05)
∆ln($)t -0.10
(0.19)
-0.97***
(0.0002)
-0.95***
(0.0002)
Conditional variance
Constant 0.00004
(0.007)
0.00009
(0.47)
0.00008
(0.50)
Arch ( )
0.11
(0.0000)
0.04
(0.22)
0.04
(0.25)
Garch ( ) 0.81(0.0000)
0.90
(0.0000)
0.90
(0.0000)
Regression statistics
N 1,101 227 227
R2(Adjusted R2) 0.04
(0.03)
0.16
(0.13)
0.17
(0.14)
F-stat (p-value) 5.8
(0.000001)
5.9
(0.000002)
5.5
(0.000002)
°Including a dummy variable which controls for the effect of the global recession of 2008-2009 (see figure 3.4)
Note: p-values are in parenthesis. Coefficients estimates are noted as significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. For
2011 our data only cover the first four months. Coefficients that are significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are noted in
bold. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm
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Table 3.2 – The correlation between wheat price and stock market returns fades away when we
control for the most tracked commodity index (S&P-GSCI) – Garch (1,1)-t model
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: ∆ln(Pwheat)t
Explicative variables Coefficients
(p-values)
1991-2006 2007-2011 2007-2011°
Constant 0.0005
(0.51)
0.0009
(0.73)
0.002
(0.49)
AR(1) 0.17***
(0.0000)
0.15**
(0.02)
0.14**
(0.2)
∆ln(S&P 500)t -0.04
(0.38)
0.25
(0.43)
0.10
(0.49)
∆ln(S&P-GSCI)t 0.15***
(0.0000)
0.25***
(0.0006)
0.25***
(0.0009)
∆ln($)t -0.13
(0.24)
-0.79***
(0.001)
-0.78***
(0.001)
Conditional variance
constant 0.000005
(0.03)
0.00008
(0.28)
0.00009
(0.30)
Arch ( ) 0.10(0.001)
0.04
(0.22)
0.04
(0.3)
Garch  ( ) 0.81(0.0000)
0.90
(0.0000)
0.90
(0.0000)
Regression statistics
N 837 226 226
R2(Adjusted R2) 0.06
(0.05)
0.21
(0.18)
0.22
(0.19)
F-stat (p-value) 7.11
(0.000000)
7.35
(0.000000)
6.68
(0.000000)
°Including a dummy variable which controls for the effect of the global recession of 2008-2009 (see figure 3.4)
Note: p-values are in parenthesis. Coefficients estimates are noted as significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. For
2011 our data only cover the first four months. Coefficients that are significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are noted in
bold. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm
When we control for the S&P-GSCI index, the correlation between wheat price and
US stock market loses statistical significance. In other words, S&P-GSCI is the
mediating factor which determines the correlation between wheat price dynamics and
US stock market returns. This result corroborates the hypothesis that commodity
index traders affect price dynamics, linking them to the US stock market fluctuations.
29
Figure 3.4 – The period “excluded” from the third regression
Wheat price and the price of oil
Let us now consider the relation between HRW wheat price and oil price. Oil is the
main component of the S&P-GSCI index. In a recent paper (2010) Tang and Xiong
show that in recent years futures prices of non-energy commodities became
increasingly correlated with oil, and that this trend is systematically more pronounced
for commodities included in the two most popular commodity indices. The results we
find here are coherent with Tang and Xiong’s findings, and add further new elements
which support the hypothesis that commodity index traders influenced recent wheat
price fluctuations.
An estimation covering the entire sample (January 1991-april 2011) produced a QLR
test statistic for structural breaks which indicates March 2008 as the most probable
breakpoint date. As in the case of the US stock market coefficient, the dynamic of the
QLR test statistic is suggestive of a gradual structural break, which has developed
during the second half of the decade (Figure 3.5). In other words, HRW wheat
dynamics and oil price movements gradually developed a correlation during the late
2000s.
We include in the regression, as control variables, the US Dollar exchange rate and
gasoline price. Controlling for the US dollar exchange rate dynamics allows us to
exclude from the analysis co-movements which are due just to the common
measuring rod. Controlling for the price of gasoline allows us to exclude from the
analysis that part of the correlation between oil price and wheat price which is
determined by the impact of the demand for biofuels. If the correlation between oil
price and wheat price was entirely due to biofuels production, it would be spurious,
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and should fade away when controlling for gasoline price (it is the gasoline price, and
not the crude oil price, that determines the profitability of biofuels).
Figure 3.5 – QLR test statistic for the ∆ln(oil)t coefficient
In table 3.3 we present the models’ estimations for the two different periods – pre-
and post-structural break - as suggested by the QLR statistics. Oil price and wheat
price, uncorrelated until 2006, become significantly correlated in the period 2007-
2011.
The gasoline price coefficient, as predicted, is not significant in 1991-2006, but
significant in 2007-2011. In other words, we find that since 2007 gasoline price has
had an impact on wheat price – so biofuels demand is probably an important factor –
but that it explains only a minor part of the link between wheat price and oil price.
As before, the post-break equation is estimated twice, in order to control for the effect
of the global recession.
Even the relation between wheat price and oil price appears to be ascribable to
commodity index traders. As shown in Table 3.4, the link between oil price and wheat
price is spurious, and the mediating factor is, once again, the S&P-GSCI index.
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Table 3.3 – Correlation between wheat price and oil price; Garch(1,1)-t model
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: ∆ln(Pwheat)t
Explicative variables Coefficients
(p-values)
1991-2006 2007-2011 2007-2011°
Constant 0.0005
(0.57)
0.0006
(0.82)
0.004
(0.23)
AR(1) 0.18***
(0.0000)
0.14**
(0.03)
0.14**
(0.03)
∆ln(Brent)t 0.008
(0.69)
0.14**
(0.02)
0.12**
(0.03)
∆ln($)t -0.16
(0.13)
-1.18***
(0.0000)
-1.14***
(0.0000)
∆ln(Gasoline)t -0.03
(0.56)
-0.15
(0.15)
-0.20**
(0.049)
Conditional variance
Constant 6*10-5
(0.02)
7*10-5
(0.40)
0.0007
(0.40)
Arch ( )
0.11
(0.001)
0.04
(0.21)
0.10
(0.34)
Garch  ( )
0.80
(0.0000)
0.91
(0.0000)
0.44
(0.47)
Regression statistics
N 836 227 227
R2(Adjusted R2) 0.04 (0.03) 0.17 (0.14) 0.18 (0.15)
F-stat (p-value) 3.9 (0.0002) 5.66 (0.000002) 5.43 (0.000001)
°Including a dummy variable which controls for the effect of the global recession of 2008-2009 (see figure 3.4)
Note: p-values are in parenthesis. Coefficients estimates are noted as significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. For
2011 our data only cover the first four months. Coefficients that are significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are noted in
bold. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm
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Table 3.4 – The correlation between wheat price and oil price fades away when we control for
the most tracked commodity index (S&P-GSCI); Garch (1,1)-t model
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE: ∆ln(Pwheat)
Explicative variables Coefficientis
(p-values)
1991-2006 2007-2011 2007-2011°
Constant 0.0003
(0.66)
0.0003
(0.91)
0.002
(0.53)
AR(1) 0.17***
(0.0000)
0.17***
(0.01)
0.17***
(0.01)
∆ln(Brent)t -0.06***
(0.01)
0.02
(0.76)
0.02
(0.80)
∆ln(S&P-GSCI)t 0.19***
(0.0000)
0.29***
(0.0001)
0.28***
(0.0001)
∆ln($)t -0.13
(0.20)
-0.94***
(0.0001)
-0.92***
(0.0000)
∆ln(Gasoline)t 0.001
(0.98)
-0.16
(0.11)
-0.18
(0.08)
Conditional variance
Constant 5.3-5
(0.03)
7.8-5
(0.34)
8.1-5
(0.39)
Arch ( )
0.10
(0.001)
0.05
(0.24)
0.04
(0.29)
Garch  ( )
0.81
(0.0000)
0.90
(0.0000)
0.90
(0.0000)
Regression statistics
N 836 227 227
R2(Adjusted R2) 0.07 (0.06) 0.23 (0.19) 0.23 (0.20)
F-stat (p-value) 6.57 (0.000000) 7.10 (0.000000) 6.6 (0.000000)
°Including a dummy variable which controls for the effect of the global recession of 2008-2009 (see figure 3.4)
Note: p-values are in parenthesis. Coefficients estimates are noted as significant at the 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) levels. For
2011 our data only cover the first four months. Coefficients that are significantly different from 0 at the 10% level are noted in
bold. All variables are expressed in first differences of the natural logarithm
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IV. Interpretation of results and concluding remarks
The first analysis (Regression 2) is a direct one, and shows that for each percentage
point increase in the market share of financial speculators, the HRW wheat price
tends to increase by one half percentage point. We must be really careful in
interpreting this result, because we are not able to state if there is a causality relation
between the two variables, and even if we assume that there is one, we don’t know
its direction. There could be an omitted variable bias (a third variable may influence
both the market share of speculators and the wheat price), or there could be a
reverse causality (which means that it is the level of prices which gives financial
speculators an incentive to join the market or to exit from it). The hypothesis which
seems to us to be more likely is the one of simultaneous causality, i.e. high prices
represent an incentive for speculators to join the market, but at the same time
financial speculators are net buyers so they push prices up. However, we are not
able to test empirically this hypothesis of simultaneous causality. Another flaw of this
first analysis is that we don’t have data for the previous period, so we can’t check for
structural breaks due to the financialization of commodity markets.
The second analysis is based on longer time-series, and it focus on the relationships
between wheat price dynamics and financial markets. In the period 1986-2006 wheat
price dynamics and stock market returns are uncorrelated, while in the period 2007-
2011 we find a statistically significant positive correlation. In the same period, and
following a similar (and quite gradual) pattern (as indicated by the QLR test
statistics), wheat prices developed a correlation with oil prices, while the correlation
with the US dollar exchange rate strengthened remarkably. Given the facts presented
in the second section, our hypothesis is that financial investors, and in particular
commodity index traders, played the main role in determining these correlations.
These financial actors are active at the same time in equity, agricultural commodity
and energy commodity markets. It is difficult to believe that their strategies in the
different markets in which they operate can be independent from each other. The
results reported in Tables 3.1-3.4 support this hypothesis. The relationships between
wheat prices, stock market returns and oil prices appear to be spurious, and
mediated by the S&P-GSCI, the most popular commodity index.
In interpreting the positive sign of the correlation between the price of wheat and US
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stock market returns, we argue that when stocks’ market value increases,
diversification incentives induce investors to move some money into commodities
(Tang and Xiong 2010).
As for the positive correlation between oil prices and wheat prices, we argue that it is
due to the way commodity index funds work. Oil is the main component of all the
most popular commodity indices. When the price of oil increases, index traders
automatically raise their investment in all the other commodities included in the index,
in order not to alter the fixed weights of the index.
The relationship between wheat prices and the US Dollar exchange rate seems to be
more complicated, and only partially ascribable to commodity index traders. The US
dollar exchange rate appears to have had a huge impact on recent wheat price
dynamics. This relationship was present even in the previous period, and its sign is
negative. This is coherent with the fact that commodities are priced in dollars, so we
expect exporters to raise prices when the dollar depreciates, especially in
oligopolistic markets, in order to keep (ceteris paribus) real prices fixed. However, the
impact of the US dollar exchange rate became remarkably stronger after 2007, so
new factors must have stepped in. We suppose that financial investors played a role,
because they see commodities as a hedge against the US dollar depreciation, but
our estimates show that only a minor part of this influence can be attributed to index
traders. We can suppose that active investors (which we called  ‘money managers’ in
the second section) were more influential in this regard, because they are more
reactive to macroeconomic signals, but there may even have been other factors
behind the relationship, which leaves room for further research.
Highlighting the influence of index traders on recent wheat price dynamics, our work
contributes to the debate on the role of financial markets in recent food price swings,
and on the need for better regulated commodity futures markets. Our empirical
analysis suggests that financial investors played an important role in affecting wheat
price fluctuations in recent years. In particular they seem to have linked wheat price
dynamics to US equity market returns and to oil price movements. The commodity
index S&P-GSCI is the confounding variable, which determines the linkage between
wheat price dynamics, stock market returns, and oil price movements. What are the
policy implications of these empirical results? In our opinion they suggest that the
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process of deregulation of commodity derivative markets, which started around the
Nineties, went too far and should now be reversed. Position limits should be
increased, and commodity index traders should not be exempted from them (as they
have been since 1991). The jurisdiction of market authorities should be extended to
OTC transactions, and to the markets which now are almost completely unregulated
(such as the ones in London). The Dodd-Frank Act, recently approved in the US, is a
step in this direction, in that it provides for the centralization and regulation of OTC
transactions. It remains to be seen how it will be implemented by the US market
authority (CFTC). Moreover, coordination between market authorities, coupled with
the imposition of analogous rules in all the main commodity exchanges, would be
necessary to impede investors bypassing rules and limits simply by trading the same
commodity on different exchanges. Commodity derivatives were created to stabilize
price dynamics. As a result of their uncontrolled expansion, they now appear to be a
factor of destabilization.
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